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In the mid 80s Daniel Dennett has published a 
series of articles on the problem of the self. His suggested 
solution to the problem is rather unique and seems to be at 
odds with some more recent work on the subject. It is my 
aim to try to square his thoughts with some other 
approaches that tentatively point to quite different sources of 
selves. Dennett in all of his papers relies heavily upon a 
strategy that made it all the way to the title of one of them. 
He speaks of selves as centers of narrative gravity (Dennett 
1992). This strategy uses two crucial components – 
language and fiction. Let me say few words about each of 
them. First, in accordance with a general tactics of his post-
behaviorism and fully in line with his method of 
heterophenomenology (see Dennett 1991), he treats mental 
phenomena in linguistic terms. We only know of a presence 
of the former via our confrontation with the latter. 
Psychological self receives the same treatment. Claiming to 
capture a fundamental building block of the self, Dennett 
gives elaborate examples of linguistic practices that lead one 
to become oneself. It is in the game of asking and answering 
questions on their history, present conditions and future 
plans or desires that organisms arrive to a coherent, stable 
and lasting view of their selves. He doesn’t seem to be 
troubled by questions of subjectivity, i.e. what constitutes 
subjects and whether in fact some accounts of their selves is 
needed. At various points where he speaks of subjects, he 
dismisses philosophical explanations and wants to replace 
them with biological ones (e.g. Dennett 1989). 
Second, this linguistic strategy leads Dennett to 
adopt an anti-foundationalist view of the self. He employs 
the metaphor of the center of gravity to illustrate that 
explanatory models in sciences are often furnished with 
items of a rather dubious ontological status. While everyone 
knows how important centers of gravity for explanations are, 
a short contemplation reveals there is no material object that 
would necessary correspond to any of them. It’s not their 
material being that constitutes their existence. Such 
abstracta enter scientific explanations to serve the purpose 
of enabling successful predictions of conduct of various 
entities. Centers of gravity help to predict behavior of 
physical objects. For a successful prediction of human 
beings, we need to utilize a different, more complicated 
fiction. “It turns out to be theoretically perspicuous to 
organize the interpretation around a central abstraction: 
each person has a self (in addition to a center of gravity). In 
fact we have to posit selves for ourselves as well“ (Dennett 
1992, 105). Although an introduction of selves with all their 
intricacies into our explanatory web presents a much more 
sophisticated problem than introduction of centers of gravity, 
it adds no more reality to the final product. Selves are as 
ficticious as centers of the gravity. „It is a category mistake to 
start looking around for the self in the brain,“ (ibid., 108 ) 
pronounces Dennett in his Rylean dialect. 
True to his naturalism, he also supplies empirical 
evidence to support his claims. In the collaborative work with 
N. Humphrey (Humphrey and Dennett 1998), he ventured to 
investigate clinical case studies of Multiple Personality 
Disorders (MPD). These cases are particularly intriguing for 
the proper treatment of the origins of the self, because 
patients with MPD exhibit a variety of fully developed selves. 
Dennett and Humphrey convincingly argue that emergence 
of multiple selves is a direct consequence of a narrative 
strategy patients employ through their development. In 
defense of their integrity under long-term attack (most of 
them have a history of child abuse), they create a second (or 
third…) personality that encompasses unwanted memories, 
moods and feelings. These are continuously supplied with a 
battery of beliefs, so that a complete psychological trait 
establishes itself. Competing selves then occupy one body. 
So far I didn’t say much new and in fact I believe on 
a certain level of description Dennett’s assertions are 
basically on the right track. However, there seem to be 
something missing in his picture. The problem of the self is 
in his picture strongly tied with operations of language. In 
fact there seem to be for him a direct correspondence 
between language use and maintenance of the self. But if 
the claim is to establish an exclusivity of language in self-
deliverance, the claim is a way too strong. If language 
produces selves and nothing else does, we should 
encounter instances of neither developed selves without 
language capacities, nor selfless language users. However, 
we find examples of both. On one hand, we seem to 
unproblematically assign selves to adult human beings 
without language (aphatics of various kinds, savants). On 
the other hand, there are humans with fully developed 
language who lack selves nevertheless. 
Now, for the first group of cases, Dennett can 
reasonably defend himself by saying that his notion of 
language is broader than that of verbal behavior. Intentional 
intelligent behavior of people without spoken language can 
still accumulate enough of subject-centered information to 
establish and preserve their selves. Under such a broad 
definition, selves could still be thought of in categories of 
language. As I don’t want to enter the debate on the nature 
of language and thinking, I will grant Dennett this strategy 
and concentrate on the second group of cases, i.e. people 
with fully developed language who fail to complete their self 
building and show some striking discrepancies in making 
distinctions between self and the rest of the world. I have in 
mind patients showing various symptoms of schizophrenia. 
In recent years, a revived interest in schizophrenia 
has brought into the light patients with particular difficulties 
pertaining to their selves. Schizophrenia is a complex 
disorder, uniquely characterized by symptoms such as 
thought insertions, alien limbs or illusions of control (Franck 
et al. 2001, 454). Clearly, such symptoms are best 
understood as problems with self-ascription of activities. And 
there is no complete self without self-ascription. 
Schizophrenic patients, while moving around, observing 
activities of others or even thinking apparently can’t locate 
the agent who does all this. In extreme cases, they either 
live in the world where they are in command of virtually 
nothing (depersonalization) or, conversely, in the world 
where they are in charge of almost everything (delusions of 
control) (Proust 2000, 308). Several research groups, 
despite the fact they greatly disagree over the general 
picture of the mind, have conclusively demonstrated that 
schizophrenic patients have significant difficulties in self-
ascription of their actions in comparison with controls when 
matched for IQ, verbal abilities, attention or memory 
capacities (see Firth 1992; Franck et al. 1997 or Stirling et 
al. 2001). These differences are present even when patient’s 
conditions are not acute. In one such an experiment, 
patients were asked to draw simple geometrical figures 
pictures out-of-sight and subsequently select their own 
works from a set of four where the additional three were 
drawn by other participants of the experiment. Overall, 




schizophrenics had much bigger difficulties appropriating 
their own works and their “impairments appeared to be 
unrelated to performance on other cognitive or attentional 
measures” (Stirling et al. 2001, 201). While fulfilling rather 
sophisticated tasks they are unaware of the task originator.  
There is something deeply puzzling about these 
results. Schizophrenics in these experiments are 
undoubtedly involved in intentional actions and it’s hard to 
see how one could interpret their behavior using non-
intentional vocabulary. (After all, they listen to the 
commands of experimenters!) It’s natural for us to ascribe 
intentionality to agents. The talk of intentionality is bound to 
who is intending, as if intentionality and subjectivity were 
intrinsically tied together. (Just on a side: I take this to be the 
reason behind the initial appeal of Searle’s Chinese room 
argument – computers can’t think as there is “nobody at 
home”.) In ordinary discourse, intentionality is paralleled by 
subjectivity. And subjectivity could be either external (it’s 
him, or them who have done this…) or internal - the self. 
Inability to find the agent therefore leads in schizophrenics to 
problems with selves. How it is possible that intentionality of 
actions of schizophrenics lacks a purported relation to its 
source? 
In her discussion of similar experiments, Joëlle 
Proust suggests there is nothing intrinsic about the 
connection between intentionality and agency (Proust 2000). 
She points out that various experimental paradigms in 
cognitive science suggest detachment of goal-directness of 
executed actions from its executor. According to her, the 
above-mentioned case of schizophrenia establishes one 
illustrative example of a more general trend. This 
dissociation is not confined to pathological cases. Normal 
subjects often entertain mental states with a dubious status 
of authorship. For example, visual imagery can be 
reasonably thought of as being deprived of its agent. This is 
not supposed to mean subjects of imagery are confused 
about who is undergoing imagery. It only says there might 
exemplify occasions in which subjects are sincerely 
confused about origins of their mental states. In this sense, 
fantasies or daydreams are often subjectless in a way 
similar to experiences of schizophrenics and one has to 
undertake a further effort to make its creator unequivocal. 
Crucially, even without such an effort mental events without 
representations of an explicit agency still seem 
phenomenologically coherent. In spite of a need for an 
additional step of determining the agent, we have no 
problem experiencing them. Although first-person accounts 
are central to discussions of the self, evidence from the 
third-person domain would make the case Proust’s case 
stronger. Fortunately, a mounting support now emerges 
from various areas of neuroscience. Indirect support for a 
separation between intentionality and agency is now offered 
by research on sensory modalities. Most of the sensory 
processes, whether visual, auditory or motor, are carried out 
by the same networks, regardless of agency involved. As 
Kosslyn’s (Kosslyn 1986) notorious findings show, visual 
imagery and vision are carried out by the same cortical 
areas. Similarly, mental simulation of action performance 
activates motor cortex (Bonnett et al. 1997).While in normal 
vision ownership appears to be locked in the viewed scene 
(i.e. there is a backward state of  awareness that indicates to 
the subject it’s her who is looking), imagery is short of clear 
agency ascription. Analogically, the difference between 
performed and simulated actions dwells, among other 
things, in owner attribution. This evidence seems to imply 
that in addition to processing of intentional sensory states 
there has to be a further neuronal processing that 
associates (or fails to associate) visual processing with its 
owner. More direct evidence bearing on the issue comes 
from a hotly debated discovery of mirror neurons in 
macaque monkeys (for discussion of results and 
implications see Gallese 2000). In a manner analogical to 
the role of visual cortical areas in imagery tasks, mirror 
neurons track intentional motor activities, usually hand 
movements. In doing so, they do not take account of 
authorship of actions and fire both in cases of grasping 
initiated by the monkey or observed grasping carried out by 
a different monkey. Thus mirror neurons appear to present 
the strongest empirical base for the needed dissociations 
between intentionality and ownership. 
Where does this lead us in our discussion of 
Dennett and his narrative strategy? It seems like Dennett is 
unaware of this dissociation and operates on the level where 
the parallelism of intentionality and subjectivity is 
unquestioned. His narrative strategy presupposes normal 
functioning of the “ownership” neural network. People 
indeed become themselves with the help of discourses they 
participate in. However, there is a permit one needs to 
obtain just to enter the game of becoming. That permit 
consists of a functioning bridge between intentionality and 
agency ascription. Once that bridge is lacking, no amount of 
game participation can cure the initial setback. It is an 
additional empirical task to discover what exactly breaks 
down in these cases – some believe a module is impaired 
(Firth 1992), others speak of lower level explanations 
(Proust 2000). It is not my intention to come up here with a 
conclusive answer. My conclusion aims elsewhere. 
Schizophrenics have no apparent problems using first-
person (or other) pronouns, they understand and produce 
sentences about themselves and easily execute tasks asked 
of them. Still, their selves are in an important aspect 
incomplete. Language is not able to help them in 
overcoming initial conditions that do not favor self-ascription. 
Behind the intended fictive anti-foundationalism of Dennett 
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